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A post-Keynesian Assessment Of Alternative 
Saudi Arabian Austerity strategies 
Robert E. Looney 
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the consequences of 
declining oil revenues for the Saudi Arabian economy. In particular, the 
paper is inter~ted ir:i.examining several alternative expenditure strategies 
open to the govern'ment that would be least disruptive to the non-oil 
manufacturing sector and in what sense? 
The interaction of government expenditures and the private sector was 
examined using a modified form of the Granger Causality test. These tests 
were performed on annual data over the period 1960 through 1992 (the 
last year for which consistent time series data are available). 
Our main finding was that contrary to what one might expect, public 
investment and infrastructure has played a minor role in stimulating private 
sector capital formation. If anything it appears that increased private sector 
investment has stimulated a follow-on expansion in government 
expenditures of this type. It follows that expenditure reductions in this area 
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Given the probability that Saudi Arabia will not experience in the near 
future a surge in oil revenues similar to those obtained in the early and late 
1970s, the major problem facing the government will be how best to utilize 
its dwindling oil revenues to generate positive overall rates of economic 
growth, while at the same time meeting to the fullest extent possible the 
basic needs of the majority of the population. Clearly any future growth 
strategy must involve devising means whereby the private sector will 
assume a more important role in expanding not only output, but perhaps 
more importantly in sustaining a level of effective domestic demand 
(Looney, 1984) to stave off any further recessionary tendencies stemming 
from reduced government expenditures. This is especially critical in the 
non-hydrocarbon manufacturing sector, which is almost totally dependent 
on the local market for sales. 
In this context, the main purpose of the analysis below is to examine 
the consequences of declining oil revenues for the Saudi Arabian 
economy. In particular, the paper is interested in examining several 
alternative expenditure strategies open to the government. In which 
general areas of government expenditure consumption (current), 
investment (infrastructure) or defense (military)-would budgetary cuts be 
the least disruptive on private investment and in what sense? 
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RECENT CONTROVERSIES 
Economic management in Saudi Arabia government has come under 
increasing criticism in recent years (Englelbert, 1993; IMF, 1993). In 
general this criticism has focused on the country's chronic and massive 
deficits in both its budget and current account balance. In particular the 
IMF (1993) has argued that Saudi Arabia's budget deficit and current 
account deficit as a percentage of GDP will increase during the coming 
years with figures for 1993 as their lowest. The IMF has been asking the 
Saudi government to review the effect of investment in the public sector, 
reconsider its policy on government subsidies, and impose taxes on non-
oil sectors. The Saudi government, however, appears to give priority to 
political and social considerations over reduction of the deficit. 
CONTRASTING VIEWS OF THE ECONOMY 
The IMF's point of view is that it is necessary for the Saudi government to 
examine the efficiency of public investment, to review various subsidies and 
related pricing policies, and to examine the possibility of taxation on non-oil 
sectors. Second, if the financial deficit is not reduced, funds in the private 
sector could flow into the government sector as a loan, resulting in a 
shortage of funds needed for private companies under a market economy. 
To counter this the Saudi Government has argued that: (1) a whole 
spectrum of policies will be reviewed in the context of the sixth 
development plan (1995-99), (2) the government promises to continue 
pursuing tighter expenditure policy, and (3) at this time political and social 
considerations have precluded a reduction in subsidies or an increase in 
fees and charges. As to the second problem of "crowding out", the Saudi 
government has argued that under present conditions of rich liquidity on 
hand through commercial banks, financing the budgetary deficits with 
loans from the private sector will not cause "crowding out" (although the 
Saudis concede that in the medium term this may occur). 
The IMF has noted two points concerning the international balance of 
payments. First, the IMF forecasts that a deficit of the current account as a 
percentage of GDP will increase from the bottom figure of 9.3% in 1993 up 
to 13.3% in 1997. The reason given by the IMF is that although income 
from oil exports will increase from the lowest figure of US $42.3 billion in 
1993 to $46.7 billion in 1997, its slow rate of increase will not be enough to 
catch up with the increase in payments for imports of goods and services. 
Second, the IMF recommends that, Saudi Arabia consider the 
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establishment of financial income sources other than oil in the near future. 
The Saudi Arabian government does not seem convinced by the IMF's 
projection of its current account balances and contends that: ( 1) such 
persistent weaknesses in the external current account could not be 
maintained, and that (2) one important ingredient for recovery will be an 
external environment that diminishes or at least does not increase, the 
impediments facing the country in marketing oil products. The gist of Saudi 
Arabia's second point is not too clear but it is likely to mean that if foreign 
countries consuming oil ease or take off regulations limiting their 
importation, then the future prospects of total exportation from Saudi 
Arabia should be much improved. Regarding the second point raised by 
the IMF relating to Saudi Arabia's policy the Saudi Government contents 
that it will (1) maintain a tight fiscal stance, (2) take additional policy 
measures to reduce the current account deficit to manageable levels and 
(3) examine possibilities of increasing income from sources other than oil. 
SHORT-RUN CONSTRAINTS 
Many of the issues noted above have been developing over the past 
several years and are likely to persist throughout the 1990s. In addition the 
country faces a number of immediate short run problems that must be 
successfully dealt with if the country is to resume steady economic expansion. 
The Oil Market. The Kingdom's 1994 budget was based on the 
assumption that the average price of Saudi oil exports would be about 
$14-15 a barrel in 1994. Although prices have recently increased the 
average for the first half of 1994 was about $2 a barrel lower than this. If 
the low prices average out over the year, oil export earnings could fall 
below $35,000 million, the lowest level since 1989. 
The Exchange Rate Policy. In recent years the decline in oil prices has 
caused the Saudi currency to come under heavy pressure from 
speculators banking on a riyal devaluation. The government has stated 
that it will maintain the value of the riyal. However, the hard riyal policy has 
drained domestic liquidity and contributed to an increase in domestic 
interest rates. 
Government Development Bonds. In 1988 the government initiated a 
bond program to finance the budget deficit. These development bonds 
carry interest rates fixed at a margin over the rate for U.S. government 
bonds. When dollar interest rates were falling, the bonds were a sound 
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investment. The rise in dollar rates since the middle of 1993 has made 
investment in Saudi Bonds increasingly unattractive. 
Debt Service. Servicing loans is a novel experience for the Saudi 
Government. In May 1991 Saudi Arabia signed its first internationally 
syndicated sovereign borrowing. The first of five quarterly principal 
payments was due in May 1994. The Finance Ministry also has to service 
a $2,500 million five year loan signed in May 1991 with local banks. 
Rebuilding Financing Reserves. It is possible that the kingdom is 
conserving cash in an effort to rebuild its liquid savings. International 
reserves fell below $10, 000 million for the first time in more than a decade 
during the spring of 1992 and they have never recovered. The effort to 
conserve cash may reflect a desire to restore reserves to prudent levels, 
particularly in view of the uncertain future trends in oil prices. 
Defense Equipment Contracts. Since June 1990 Saudi Arabia is 
reported to have agreed to buy 30,000 million worth of defense equipment 
from the US alone. Deliveries are increasing and cash payments due to 
American manufacturers are rising. It is estimated that the schedule for 
cash payments due under foreign military sales (FMS) called for a total of 
$4,200 million to be paid in 1994 and $5,000 million in 1995. It has been 
apparent for at least a year that the kingdom could not support this 
payment program. 
Balancing the Budget. A further influence is the management of the 20 
percent across-the board cut in public spending called for in the 1994 
budget. This aims to eliminate the deficits that have been a feature of state 
fiscal policy since 1982. Spending department have been told they must 
adhere to the spending target. However suppliers have been given little 
guidance about the priorities for 1994. The expenditure review has 
compounded the uncertainty in the business community. It may have 
contributed to the general slowdown in government disbursements. 
MAIN CHALLENGES 
In dealing with these issues the Saudi authorities will have to confront 
several major challenges. The first is structural. Economists forecast that 
the rate of growth of Saudi hydrocarbon earnings in the next five years will 
be lower than the expansion in the obligations of the Saudi state. The 
conclusion is that the budget deficit could continue indefinitely unless 
appropriate action is taken. 
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The second challenge is more psychological. It involves increased 
uncertainty among potential creditors is being compounded by the 
absence of a clear indication about the methods the kingdom will use to 
raise the finance needed to bridge the gap between today's deficits and 
the better days that should come at the end of the century. Will there be 
more loan syndications? Is the government debt market to be developed 
to include floating rate securities? Will export credits be sought? When will 
the stock market be opened up to foreign investors, if at all? 
POST-KEYNESIAN ASSUMPTIONS 
In the analysis that follows, we have implicitly assumed a series of Post 
Keynesian type relationships hold. These entail the various impacts on the 
economy, and particularly private investment stemming from the different 
classes of government expenditure investment, consumption, and defense. 
The Post Keynesian approach (Eichner, 1975, 1978, 1979; Gapinski, 1979; 
Mankiw, 1993) is much too eclectic to adequately summarize here. 
However, one of its attractive features for examining government policy in 
Saudi Arabia is that the approach offers a framework for examining the 
relationship between the components of public sector demand, income 
distribution and private investment. 
In place of the relative price variable which is the focal point of a 
neoclassical analysis, Post Keynesian (Romer, 1993) theory makes 
investment the key determinant of most economic aggregates. This follows 
from an underlying belief that in a dynamic, expanding economy, the 
income effects produced by investment and other sources of growth far 
outweigh the substitution effects resulting from price movements. That is 
changes in demand, both aggregate and sectoral, are due more to 
changes in income than to changes in relative prices. 
Perhaps more importantly, Saudi Arabia possesses a number of 
structural characteristics that would seem to preclude an automatic 
equilibration of most markets at or near full employment (Nagi, 1982): 
1. Government expenditures play a pervasive role in the economy, 
accounting in recent years for well over half of aggregate demand. 
2. Financial markets are still underdeveloped. 
3. The relatively low population base puts some limit on the size of the 
market and competition. 
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These factors combine to produce macroeconomic instability (IMF 
1993a) which, in turn, reduces growth through several channels. First, by 
distorting price signals so that these no longer reflect underlying scarcities, 
it results in the misallocation of resources and reduced productivity. 
Second, macroeconomic instability increases uncertainty and reduces the 
rate of investment, as potential investors wait for uncertainty to dissipate 
before committing resources. Capital flight, which is likely to increase with 
macroeconomic instability, further reduces investment in the domestic 
economy. High and variable inflation, an important source of 
macroeconomic instability, further depresses investment, often by lowering 
real returns to saving. Large fiscal deficits may lead to the crowding out of 
private investment by raising real interest rates. High deficits, which result 
in rapid accumulation of public debt, may also signal higher taxes and 
lower public investment in the future. 
The implications of this situation in terms of private sector investment 
are that government expenditures may crowd (Looney and Frederiksen 
1987) out private investment either in a real sense (competition for factors 
of production) or in a financial sense (competition for financing). 
BUDGETARY STRATEGIES 
At first sight, the most logical austerity program would be one of 
concentrating on a selective reduction in defense expenditure allowing 
resources to be freed up to finance (more productive) government 
programs. Since the early 1980s defense alone has averaged around 30-
40 percent of the national budget with the latest figure of 41 percent in 
1993 (USACDA 1995). 
It is not at all clear how much of the allocations to defense are in 
excess of what is needed on purely strategic grounds. Although Saudi 
Arabia has spent massively on developing an extensive military 
infrastructure and in purchasing the most sophisticated hardware available, 
the rationales for this expenditure have been articulated in only the most 
general terms. 
These are to enable the kingdom to protect it's extensive borders from 
regional or superpower incursions and to ensure internal security 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 1986:6). In terms of constraints, the country's 
purchasing program has been limited only by the lack of absorptive 
capacity, trained manpower and the willingness of the U.S. to supply 
certain weapons systems. 
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The first dilemma therefore facing the Saudi authorities is whether the 
country can justify the high costs of military expenditures when a distinct 
possibility exists that cut backs in defense could free up sufficient funds to 
offset most of the budgetary cuts in the non defense area brought about 
by the oil price declines. 
Along these lines, classical theory would predict on the basis of 
resource allocation that increases in defense will decrease investment 
and/or civilian consumption and thus reduce industrial output. Increased 
military burdens would, in this situation, have to be justified on the basis of 
other social welfare gains such as an increase in collective security. 
Keynesian theory, on the other hand, suggests that in the presence of 
inadequate effective demand the operation of the income multiplier would 
result in an increase in industrial output, resulting from additional defense 
expenditures. Of course one could always argue that expenditure on either 
consumption or investment would have a greater domestic expenditure 
multiplier on private sector incomes and rates of production than that 
produced by military expenditures Thus, there are purely economic 
rationales for increased military spending. Whether or not military 
expenditures have a positive economic impact relative to other sources of 
demand is ultimately an empirical question (Deger and Smith 1985). 
The second budgetary dilemma currently facing the Saudi authorities 
concerns the wisdom of further expanding the kingdom's infrastructure. 
During the last decade, Saudi Arabia has had perhaps the largest ever 
program of investment in transport and related infrastructure. Since the 
expansion in oil revenues in 1973/7 4 the country invested in a wide variety 
of programs to expand not only its road network, but sea and air ports as 
well. In large part, the rationale for this program was based on the 
presumption that the cost reducing impact of this investment would make 
private investment much more profitable, and thus stimulate a major 
expansion in private sector output. 
The possibility that public sector investment in infrastructure can 
stimulate not only increased levels of private sector investment, but overall 
increases in industrial output as well, has long intrigued economists. This 
possibility is clearly suggested by infrastructure's key role in Hirschman's 
(1958) unbalanced development strategy. 
Tersely put, Hirschman advocated that in countries where the private 
sector is somewhat squeamish about risk taking, the government could 
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stimulate private sector capital formation, and follow on increases in 
industrial output through massive investments in such areas as 
transportation, and energy thereby reducing the costs of commercial 
production, While not explicitly acknowledged, Hirschman's notions of 
imbalance through massive investments 'in infrastructure underlie Saudi 
Arabia's development strategy (Looney and Frederiksen, 1985). 
In terms of financing, the Saudi authorities have spent more on 
infrastructure in the last fifteen years than any country in history over a 
similar time period. In terms of the focus of the present study, the relevant 
question is whether the Saudi Arabian government's strategy of 
infrastructure led investment been successful in the Hirschman sense i.e., 
has it resulted in distinctly higher levels of private investment over and 
above the levels likely to exist in the absence of these programs? If not, 
what impacts have been associated with infrastructural investment and 
have these effects been superior to those that would have resulted from 
either consumption or military expenditures? 
The analysis below is largely quantitative since a key element in 
assessing these issues revolves around the issue of causality. That is 
have the government's expenditures resulted in a follow on set of effects 
on private investment or, instead, has private investment created 
pressures for the government to expand its expenditures? In turn, answer 
to these questions will in large part determine the appropriate strategies 
for fiscal policy. 
THE ISSUE OF CAUSATION 
As noted, previous studies (Looney, 1989, 1989a, 1990, 1991, and 
1992) have suggested that government expenditures in Saudi Arabia have 
been a mixed blessing. On the one hand, these expenditures have the 
potential to increase private sector profitability either through increases in 
aggregate demand (the Keynesian effect) and/or cost reductions (the 
infrastructural effect). On the other hand, public expenditures appear to 
compete for funds and physical resources with the private sector, thus 
reducing ceteris paribus the total volume of private capital formation. 
Little can be said on these issues until the issue of causation is 
adequately resolved: 
1. Often in studies of this type the direction of causation has implicitly 
been assumed to go from government deficits to expanded domestic 
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borrowing to interest rate increases and ultimately reduced private 
investment. One could just as easily argue that increased levels of 
private investment have placed pressure on the government to expand 
facilities, especially in energy. The government, wishing to aid private 
investment while simultaneously lacking adequate funding for major 
infrastructural programs, may first grant the private sector various forms 
of relief such as tax holidays followed by modest increases in public 
investment. The outcome of this process would be expanded deficits, 
but not necessarily the crowding out of private, investment in the 
classical sense. The causation issue must be addressed before any 
definitive conclusion can be made concerning crowding out. 
2. As a related issue, the timing of these impacts needs to be identified. 
Many effects associated with government expenditures are likely to 
have a delayed impact on private investment decisions. Again because 
the precise timing of these effects has not been identified, the patterns 
of causation are unclear. 
GRANGER TEST 
The original and most widely used causality test was developed by 
Granger (1969). According to this test (again using the example of public 
expenditures and private investment), government expenditures (GE) 
affect growth of public sector investment (Pl) if private investment can be 
predicted more accurately by past values of public expenditures than by 
past values of private investment. To be certain that causality runs from 
GE to Pl, past values of GE must also be more accurate than past values 
of Pl in predicting increases in public expenditures. 
More formally, Granger (1969) defines causality such that X Granger 
causes (G-C) Y if Y can be predicted more accurately in the sense of 
mean square error, with the use of past values of X than without using 
past X. Based upon the definition of Granger causality, a simple bivariate 
autoregressive (AR) model for public expenditures (GE) and Pl can be 
specified as follows: 
p q 
(1) PI(t) = c + L a(i)PI(t - i) + L b(j)GE(t - j) + u(t) 
i=l j=l 
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r s 
(2) GE(t) = c + L d(i) GE(t - 1) + L e(j)PI(t) + v(t) 
i=l j=l 
where GE is the growth in public sector expenditures and Pl = the 
growth in private investment; p, q, r and s are lag lengths for each variable 
in the equation; and u and v are serially uncorrelated white noise 
residuals. By assuming that error terms (u, v) are «nice» ordinary least 
squares (OLS) becomes the appropriate estimation method<1> . 
Within the framework of unrestricted and restricted models, a joint F-
test is appropriate for causal detection. Where: 
(3) F = (RSS(r)-RSS(u)/(df(r)-df(u) 
RSS(u)/df(u) 
RSS(r) and RSS(u) are the residual sum of squares of restricted and 
unrestricted models, respectively; and df(r) and df(u) are, respectively, the 
degrees of freedom in restricted and unrestricted models. 
The Granger test detects causal directions in the following manner: 
first, unidirectional causality from GE to Pl if the F-test rejects the null 
hypothesis that past values of GE in equation (1) are insignificantly 
different from zero and if the F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
past values of Pl in equation (2) are insignificantly different from zero. That 
is, GE causes Pl but PE does not cause GE. Unidirectional causality runs 
from Pl to GE if the reverse is true. Second, bi-directional causality runs 
between GE and Pl if both F-test statistics reject the null hypotheses in 
equations (1) and (2). Finally, no causality exists between GE and Pl if we 
can not reject both null hypotheses at the conventional significance level. 
The results of Granger causality tests depend critically on the choice of 
lag length. If the chosen lag length is less than the true lag length, the 
omission of relevant lags can cause bias. If the chosen lag is greater than 
the true lag length, the inclusion of irrelevant lags causes estimates to be 
inefficient. While it is possible to choose lag lengths based on preliminary 
partial autocorrelation methods, there is 110 a priori reason to assume lag 
lengths equal for all types of deficits. 
THE HASAIO PROCEDURE 
To overcome the difficulties noted above, Hsaio (1981) developed a 
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systematic method for assigning lags. This method combines Granger 
Causality and Akaike's final prediction error (FPE), the (asymptotic) mean 
square prediction error, to determine the optimum lag for each variable. In 
a paper examining the problems encountered in choosing lag lengths, 
Thornton and Batten (1985) found Hsiao's method to be superior to both 
arbitrary lag length selection and several other systematic procedures for 
determining lag length. 
The first step in Hsiao's procedure is to perform a series of autoregressive 
regressions on the dependent variable. In the first regression, the dependent 
variable has a lag of one. This increases by one in each succeeding 
regression. Here, we estimate M regressions of the form: 
m 
(4) G(t) =a+ L b(t - l)G(t - 1) + e(i) 
i=l 
where the values of m range from 1 to M. For each regression, we 
compute the FPE in the following manner 
T + m + 1 (5) FPE(m) = ESS(m)/T 
T - m - 1 
Where: T is the sample size, and FPE(m) and ESS(m) are the final 
prediction error and the sum of squared errors, respectively. The optimal 
lag length, m*, is the lag length which produces the lowest FPE. Having 
determined m* additional regressions expand the equation with the lags on 
the other variable added sequentially in the same manner used to 
determine m*. Thus we estimate four regressions of the form: 
m• n 
(6) G(t) =a+ L b(t - l)G(t - 1) + L c(t - l)D(t - 1) + e(i) 
i=l i=l 
with n ranging from one to four. Computing the final prediction error for 
each regression as: 
* T+m•+n+l 
FPE(m ,n) = T- m* _ n __ 1 Ess(m*,n)/T 
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we choose the optimal lag length for D, n* as the lag length which 
produces the lowest FPE. Using the final prediction error to determine lag 
length is equivalent to using a series of F tests with variable levels of 
significance<2 > . 
The first term measures the estimation error and the second term 
measures the modeling error. The FPE criterion has a certain optimality 
property that "balances the risk due to bias when a lower order is selected 
and the risk due to increases in the variance when a higher order is 
selected (Hsaio, 1979)." As noted by Judge (1982) et. al., an intuitive 
reason for using the FPE criterion is that longer lags increase the first term 
but decrease the RSS of the second term, and thus the two opposing 
forces are optimality balanced when their product reaches its minimum. 
Depending on the value of the final prediction errors, four cases are 
possible: (a) Government Expenditures cause Private Investment when 
the prediction error for private investment decreases when government 
expenditures are included in the investment equation. In addition, when 
private investment is added to the government expenditure equation, the 
final prediction error should increase; (b) Private Investment causes 
Government Expenditures when the prediction error for government 
expenditures falls when private investment is added to the regression 
equation for public expenditures, and is increased when public 
expenditures are added to the regression equation for private investment; 
(c) Feedback occurs when the final prediction error decreases when 
government expenditures are added to the private investment equation, 
and the final prediction error decreases when private investment is added 
to the government expenditure equation; and (d) No Relationship exists 
when the final prediction error increases both when government 
expenditures are added to the private investment equation and when 
private investment is added to the government expenditure equation. 
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES 
The government expenditure figures used to carry out the causation 
tests was for the period 1960-1992 and was derived from data provided by 
the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (various issues): All variables were 
deflated by the non-oil GDP deflater. For best statistical results (Hsaio, 
1981; Joerding, 1986 and Doan, 1992) the variables were transformed into 
their logarithmic values<3> . 
Relationships were considered valid if they were statistically significant 
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at the ninety-five percent level of confidence. That is, if ninety-five percent 
of the time we could conclude that they had not occurred by pure chance, 
we considered them statistically significant. 
As noted above, there is no theoretical reason to believe that private 
investment and government expenditures by category have a set lag 
relationship-that is they impact on one another over a fixed time period. 
To find the optimal adjustment period of impact, lag structures of up to six 
years were estimated. The lag structure with the highest level of statistical 
significance was the one chosen best depict the relationship under 
consideration (the optimal lag reported in Table 1 )<4> . 
In terms of data the greatest difficulty involved the lack of data as to the 
value and composition of the kingdom's stock of infrastructure. In 
particular official Saudi data on government investment contains both 
infrastructural and non - infrastructural type expenditures. Conceivably the 
cost reducing effect of the infrastructure component of government 
investment could be offset by the potential crowding out of private sector 
activity stemming from the non - infrastructural component. 
To avoid these potential problems it was first necessary to separate out 
and estimate the independent effects of the different categories of public 
investment. Since the raw data itself does not allow these distinctions to 
be made, a proxy measure for the infrastructural and non - infrastructural 
components of government investment had to be developed. Following 
Blejer and Khan (1985) this involved making a distinction between types of 
public investment on the basis of whether or not that investment was 
expected or not. 
Expected investment was assumed to be depicted by past patterns 
trend in investment< 5 > . Again, it is assumed that expected public 
investment reflects investment in infrastructure. Similarly, transitory 
government investment was assumed to be depicted by that component of 
public investment that was unexpected. Operationally, unexpected public 
investment was defined as the difference between the actual (realized) 
level of government investment and that was expected. Clearly, the basic 
assumption underlying these proxies is that infrastructure investment is an 
on going process that moves slowly over time and cannot be changed very 
rapidly. 
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In a similar manner, proxies were developed for permanent and 
transitory government consumption, with permanent consumption 
reflective of long term trends in government salaries and subsidies and 
transitory government consumption reflecting short term adjustments to 
changing revenues. 
Expected military expenditures are reflective of long term weapons 
acquisition and infrastructure development, while unexpected military 
expenditures were assumed to reflect short run responses to changes in 
the kingdom's perceived security situation. 
RESUlTS 
Causality tests were performed on Saudi data for the period from 1960 
through 1992 (the last year for which consistent time series data is 
available). The analysis produced a number of interesting patterns that are 
summarized in Table 1. Specifically: 
1. Contrary to what one might expect, public investment and infrastructure 
has played a minor role in stimulating private sector capital formation. If 
anything it appears that increased private sector investment has been 
stimulated a follow-on expansion in government expenditures of this 
type. 
2. In contrast defense expenditures have provided a fairly strong stimulus 
to the private sector. However, short run increases in defense have not 
resulted in an expansion in private sector capital formation. 
3. The reverse pattern occurs with non-military expenditures. As with 
public investment, this category of expenditures generally increases 
following an expansion in private sector investment. 
4. The most complex pattern involves public consumption. Actual public 
consumption interacts in a feed back mechanism with private 
investment with increases in public consumption providing a week 
stimulus to private investment. In turn increased private investment 
elicits a follow-on expansion in public consumption. Longer run 
expansion in public consumption, however appears largely affected by 
private investment with short run government consumption providing 
some stimulus to the private sector. 
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Table 1 
Saudi Arabia: Interaction of 
Public Expenditures and Private Investment, 1960-1992 
A B c D 
Public Investment 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 2 2 
Final Prediction Error (0.28e-1) (0.29e-1) (0.38e-1) (0.32e-1) 
F Statistic 
Causality pattern private investment-> public infrastructure ( + m) 
Public Infrastructure 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 3 2 3 
Final Prediction Error (0.28e-1) (0.29e-1) (0.25e-1) (0.20e-1) 
Causality pattern private investment-> public infrastructure ( + m) 
Public non-infrastructural investment 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 2 2 
Final Prediction Error (0.28e-1) (0.28e-1) (0.36e-1) (0.33e-2) 
Causality pattern: private investment-> non-infrastructural public 
investment ( + m) 
Actual Military Expenditures 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 1 1 1 
Final Prediction Error (0.28e-1) (0.25e-1) (0.37e-1) (0.39e-1) 
Causuality pattern: Military Expenditures-> Private Investment ( + m) 
Expected Military Expenditures • 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 1 1 2 
Final Prediction Error (0.28e-1) (0.23e-1) (0.26e-1) (0.27e-1) 
Causality pattern: Military Expenditures-> Private Investment ( + m) 
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Table 1 (conted.) 
Saudi Arabia: Interaction of 
Autumn 1995 
Public Expenditures and Private Investment, 1960-1992 
A B C 
Unexpected Military Expenditures 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 3 
Final Prediction Error (0.28e-1) (0.29e-1) (0.39e-1) 
Causality pattern: No relationship 




Optimal Lag (years) 1 1 1 2 
Final Prediction Error (0.28e-1) (0.28e-1) (0.86e-1) (0.74e-1) 
Causallity pattern: Private Investment-> Non-Military ( + m) 
Expected Non-Military Expenditures 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 
Final Prediction Error (0.28e-1) (0.30e-1) (0.60e-1) (0.40e-1) 
Causality pattern: Private Investment-> Non-Military ( + m) 
Un-Expected Non-Military Expenditures 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 1 2 2 
Final Prediction Error (0.28e-1) (0.28e-1) (0.99e-1) (0.92e-1) 
Causuality pattern: Private investment-> Non-Military ( + m) 
Actual Public Consumption 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 4 1 1 
Final Prediction Error (0.28e-1) (0.26e-1) (0.22e-1) (0.21 e-1) 
Causality pattern: Feedback ( + w, + w) 
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Saudi Arabia: Interaction of 
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Public Expenditures and Private Investment, 1960-1992 
A B C D 
Expected Public Consumption 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 2 1 1 
Final Prediction Error (0.28e-1) (0.29e-1) (0.19e-1) (0.18e-1) 
Causality pattern: Private Investment-> Public Consumption ( + w) 
Un-Expected Public Consumption 
Optimal Lag (years) 1 2 3 1 
Final Prediction Error (0.28e-1) (0.27e-1) (0.23e-1) (0.25e-1) 
Causality pattern: Public Consumption-> Private Investment ( + w) 
Notes: Summary of results obtained from Granger Causality Tests. A 
Hsaio Procedure was incorporated General Public Investment to 
determine the optimal lag. All variables estimated in their logarithmic form. 
Anticipated infrastructure is the valued predicted by regressing public 
investment on its value in the previous year. Actual infrastructure 
approximated as the smoothed exponential trend of public investment. 
Regression Patterns: A = private investment on private investment; B = 
public expenditures on private investment; C = government expenditures 
on government expenditures; and D = private investment on government 
expenditures. The Dominant pattern is that with the lowest final prediction 
error. The signs ( + ,-) represent the direction of impact. In the case of 
feedback the two signs represent the lowest final prediction error of 
relationships B and D. Each of the variables was regressed with 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6 year lags. Strength assessment (s = strong; m = moderate; w = 
weak) based on the size of the standardized regression coefficient. 
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Conclusions 
The main thrust of the analysis undertaken above has been to assess 
the possibility of redirected government expenditures as a way of 
overcoming the deflationary effects associated with falling oil revenues and 
the need for sustained austerity in public sector expenditures. Particular 
interest has been in the ability of the government to sustain private 
investment through altering the composition (but not necessarily level) of 
public sector expenditures. 
With regard to the government's infrastructure program, one can only 
conclude that the Saudi Arabian development strategy, based largely on 
the assumptions of a Hirschman type unbalanced growth strategy greatly 
overestimated the willingness of entrepreneurs to shift resources to directly 
productive investment as costs of production fell. Put differently the Saudi 
Arabian private sector does not appear interested in investing in fixed plant 
and equipment solely as a result of the Hirschman type cost reducing 
linkages stemming form the public sector's infrastructure led development 
strategy. The causality analysis suggests that the inability of public 
investment to stimulate private investment is not the result of a crowding 
out process. If this is the case, government expenditure reductions in this 
area are not per se likely to cause a significant down turn in private 
investment. 
The lack of any appreciable crowding out effects is also indicated by 
the fact that the spread effects stemming from the government's military 
programs induce a fairly strong response from the private sector. Based 
on current commitments these expenditures are likely to remain high for 
the medium term. If past patterns hold, private sector investment should 
remain buoyant even in light of cut backs in public investment and 
consumption. 
Notes 
1 - If the disturbances of the model were serially correlated, the OLS estimates would be 
inefficient, although still unbiased, and would distort the causal relations. The existence of 
serial correlation was checked by using a maximum likelihood correlation for the first-
order autocorrelation of the residuals [AR(1 )]. The comparison of both OLS and AR(1) 
results indicated that no significant changes appeared in causal directions. Therefore, we 
can conclude "roughly' that serial correlation was not serious in this model. 
2 - Since the F statistic is redundant in this instance they are not reported here. They are, 
however, available form the authors upon request. 
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3 - The time series must be stationary to yield valid Granger Tests (Doornik and Hendry 
1992). In this regard the finding of a unit root in a time series indicates non-stationarity. In . 
a well known paper, Dickey and Fuller (1981) suggested a method for computing a test 
for a unit root in a time series and presented critical values for their proposed tests with 
and without the trend variable included. Dickey-Fuller (OF) tests (Dickey and Fuller 1979 
1981) were performed using PC Give Version 7.0 (Doornik and Hendry 1992). in a simple 
case where xt = a + bxt-1 + et where b = 1 which generates a random walk (with drift if 
a not equal to 0). Here the autoregressive coefficient is unitary and stationarity is violated. 
A process with no unit or explosive roote is said to be 1(0); the Durbin-Watson (OW) 
statistic for the level of a variable offers one simple characterisaction of this integrated 
property. For example. if xt is a random walk, OW will be very small. If xt is white noise, 
OW will be around 2. Very low OW values thus indicate that a transformed model may be 
desirable perhaps including a mixture of differenced and disequilibrium values. An 
examination of the series used in the causation analysis indicated that a non-stationarity 
set of relatinships exists. 
4 - As a practical matter, the results were insensitive to the manner in which a variable was 
defined-actual, expected, and unexpected usually provided a consistent picture. Because 
of this only the actual impacts are summarized in the tables below. However because of 
its importance government investment in the form of infrastructure (here proxied as 
expected, or on-going government expenditure are also included in the set of main 
findings. The findings for the other variable definitions are available from the author upon 
request. 
5 - Expected expenditures were calculated as: Exp(t) = a + b[Exp(t-1)], with the parameters 
(a) and (b) estimated over the period 1960-92. 
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